On the origin and development of aesthetics in India.

1. Premadharma o Rāsalīlā.-- 2. Bedānta o bijñāna ebaṃ Jagadgurura ābirbhāba.-- 3. Upanishad-brahmatattva ebaṃ yājñabalkyera advaitabāda.-- 4. Upanishad-jaṛa o jībatattva.-- 5. Karmabāda o janmāntara, abatāratattva ebaṃ prakr̥ta yoga ki? -- v. 6. Sāṃkhya paricaẏa, Buddhadebera 'nāstikatā' ebaṃ buddhi o bodhi. -- v. 7. Gītāẏa Īśvarabāda, Raṅgamatī, ebaṃ Meghadūta (mūla o padyānubāda).

Treatise, with commentaries, on Navya-Nyāya philosophy.

Commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's Tattvacintāmaṇididhiti dealing with minor premise (pakṣatā) according to navya-nyāya point of view.

Classical work with Tarkāmr̥tataraṅgiṇī by Mukundabhaṭṭa, 19th cent. and Caṣaka and Caṣakatātparya by Gaṅgārāmajaḍī, 18th cent., on Nyaya philosophy.

Nyāyadarśanam.--Vaiśeṣikadarśanam.--Sāṅkhyadarśanam.--Yogadarśanam.--Mīmāṃsādarśanam.- -Vedāntadarśanam.

Gloss on Raghunathaśiromaṇi's Dīdhiti, commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, basic work on neo-Nyaya school in Hindu philosophy.

Supercommentary on Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti, 16th century commentary, by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi on Tattvacintāmaṇi, 13th century basic work of the neo-Nyāya school in Hindu philosophy, by Gaṅgeśa; portion dealing with definition of invariable concomitance (vyāpti).

Critical edition of treatise on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy with commentary.

Study of Yogasūtra of Patañjali and Vyāsabhāṣya, commentary on Yogasūtra by Vyāsa.

First Words, Last Words charts an intense "pamphlet war" that took place in sixteenth-century South India. The book explores this controversy as a case study in the dynamics of innovation in early modern India, a time of great intellectual innovation. This debate took place within the traditional discourses of Vedic Hermeneutics, or Mīmāṃsā, and its increasingly influential sibling discipline of Vedānta, and its proponents among the leading intellectuals and public figures of the period. At the heart of this dispute lies (...) the role of sequence in the cognitive processing of textual information, especially of a scriptural nature. Vyāsatīrtha and his grand-pupil Vijayīndratīrtha, writers belonging to the camp of Dualist Vedānta, purported to uphold the radical view of their founding father, Madhva, who believed, against a long tradition of Mīmāṃsā interpreters, that the closing portion of a scriptural passage should govern the interpretation of its opening. By contrast, the Nondualist Appayya Dikshita ostensibly defended this tradition's preference for the opening. But, as the book shows, the debaters gradually converged on a profoundly novel hermeneutic-cognitive theory in which sequence played little role, if any. In fact, they knowingly broke new ground, and only postured as traditionalists. First Words, Last Words explores the nature of theoretical innovation in this debate and sets it against the background of comparative examples from other major scriptural interpretive traditions. The book briefly surveys the use of sequence in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic hermeneutics and also seeks out parallel cases of covert innovation in these traditions. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...) the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition. Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something, or even conditions for representing something objectively. Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the propositional thinking that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)

Articles chiefly on the Bratachāri Movement, founded and popularised by Gurusadaẏa Datta, 1882-1941; includes articles on nationalism with special reference to Bengal, India.

This chapter discusses what maximin egalitarians should think about two types of age-sensitive taxation. One is a form of cumulative income taxation, which taxes yearly incomes taking into account all earlier income years instead of only the last one. The second is age-differentiated taxation, which taxes yearly incomes adjusting the rate to the taxpayer’s age. The chapter first presents the main reasons supporting cumulative income taxation and then proceeds to look at how it affects fiscal obligations across life. Then it (...) argues that egalitarians should aim at a fiscal reform that benefits the young and the elderly but not the middle-aged. Finally, it questions whether cumulative income taxes can deliver this without resorting to age-differentiated taxes. The chapter shows that while cumulative income taxation can benefit the young, age-differentiated taxes are necessary to benefit the elderly. (shrink)

Memoirs of Saʻīd Pīshdād, 1955 or 1956-; school administrators professional ethics, Iran.

What are things like the Supreme Court? Gabriel Uzquiano has defended that they are groups, entities which are somehow composed of members (at certain times) but which, unlike sets (or pluralities), allow for fluctuation in membership. The main alternative holds that 'the Supreme Court' refers (at any time) to the set (or plurality) of their members (at the time). Uzquiano motivates his view by posing a metaphysical puzzle for this reductive alternative. I argue that a parallel reasoning would also find (...) a corresponding 'puzzle' in the case of singular terms like 'The Chief Supreme Court Justice'. (shrink)

The idea that what we perceive are tropes is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, either as a supporting argument for the advantages of content view when compared to the relational view of experience, or as a supporting argument in favor of the irreducible subjective character of experience. (...) In this paper, I take the content view for granted and argue in favor of what is herein referred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference to the best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on the experience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption that there are different layers of content, or so shall I argue. (shrink)

Transcript of speeches by a Hindu philosopher, chiefly on Hindu philosophy and Hinduism.

The present text discusses the problems concerning the translation and the non- translation of the thinking word Dasein in Sein und Zeit. Assuming that for Heidegger Dasein is transcendence and this as an in-finitive trans-lation from a substantive and substantial meaning of being to a verbal one, it becomes necessary to translate the word Dasein in Sein und Zeit above all within the German language itself. The task of translating the thinking word Dasein is therefore the one of making possible (...) the work of thought in which the destruction of the substantialistic meaning of being can take place always anew. Showing the verbal temporality of the thinking word Dasein as the internal and aspectual temporality of a Währenden, the article explains the translating choices made in my translation of Sein und Zeit into Portuguese. (shrink)

Donald Smith (2006) argues that if ‘I’ is indeed vague, and the view of vagueness as semantic indecision correct after all, then ‘I’ cannot refer to a composite material object. But his considerations would, if sound, also establish that ‘Tibbles,’ ‘Everest,’ or ‘Toronto,’ do not refer to composite material objects either—nor hence, presumably, to cats, mountains, or cities. And they can be resisted, anyway. Or so I argue.

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith , “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive (...) similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

Response to Max Kölbel: "A Criterion for Objectivity", Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2.

On Dvaita Vedanta philosophy and doctrines of Nimbarka, sect in Vaishnavism; with Hindi interpretation.